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Abstract—Malicious URL, a.k.a. malicious website, is a com-
mon and serious threat to cybersecurity. Malicious URLs host
unsolicited content (spam, phishing, drive-by exploits, etc.) and
lure unsuspecting users to become victims of scams (monetary
loss, theft of private information, and malware installation), and
cause losses of billions of dollars every year. It is imperative to
detect and act on such threats in a timely manner. Traditionally,
this detection is done mostly through the usage of blacklists.
However, blacklists cannot be exhaustive, and lack the ability
to detect newly generated malicious URLs. To improve the gen-
erality of malicious URL detectors, machine learning techniques
have been explored with increasing attention in recent years. This
article aims to provide a comprehensive survey and a structural
understanding of Malicious URL Detection techniques using
machine learning. We present the formal formulation of Mali-
cious URL Detection as a machine learning task, and categorize
and review the contributions of literature studies that addresses
different dimensions of this problem (feature representation,
algorithm design, etc.). Further, this article provides a timely and
comprehensive survey for a range of different audiences, not only
for machine learning researchers and engineers in academia, but
also for professionals and practitioners in cybersecurity industry,
to help them understand the state of the art and facilitate their
own research and practical applications. We also discuss practical
issues in system design, open research challenges, and point out
some important directions for future research.
Index Terms—Malicious URL Detection, Machine Learning,
Online Learning, Internet security, Cybersecurity
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of new communication technologies has had
tremendous impact in the growth and promotion of businesses
spanning across many applications including online-banking,
e-commerce, and social networking. In fact, in today’s age
it is almost mandatory to have an online presence to run a
successful venture. As a result, the importance of the World
Wide Web has continuously been increasing. Unfortunately,
the technological advancements come coupled with new so-
phisticated techniques to attack and scam users. Such attacks
include rogue websites that sell counterfeit goods, financial
fraud by tricking users into revealing sensitive information
which eventually lead to theft of money or identity, or even
installing malware in the user’s system. There are a wide
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variety of techniques to implement such attacks, such as ex-
plicit hacking attempts, drive-by exploits, social engineering,
phishing, watering hole, man-in-the middle, SQL injections,
loss/theft of devices, denial of service, distributed denial of
service, and many others. Considering the variety of attacks,
potentially new attack types, and the innumerable contexts in
which such attacks can appear, it is hard to design robust
systems to detect cyber-security breaches. The limitations of
traditional security management technologies are becoming
more and more serious given this exponential growth of new
security threats, rapid changes of new IT technologies, and
significant shortage of security professionals. Most of these
attacking techniques are realized through spreading compro-
mised URLs (or the spreading of such URLs forms a critical
part of the attacking operation) [1].
URL is the abbreviation of Uniform Resource Locator,
which is the global address of documents and other resources
on the World Wide Web. A URL has two main components
: (i) protocol identifier, it indicates what protocol to use, (ii)
resource name, it specifies the IP address or the domain name
where the resource is located. The protocol identifier and the
resource name are separated by a colon and two forward
slashes. An example is shown in Figure 1.
Compromised URLs that are used for cyber attacks are
termed as malicious URLs. In fact, it was noted that close to
one-third of all websites are potentially malicious in nature [2],
demonstrating rampant use of malicious URLs to perpetrate
cyber-crimes. A Malicious URL or a malicious web site hosts
a variety of unsolicited content in the form of spam, phishing,
or drive-by-exploits in order to launch attacks. Unsuspecting
users visit such web sites and become victims of various
types of scams, including monetary loss, theft of private
information (identity, credit-cards, etc.), and malware installa-
tion. Popular types of attacks using malicious URLs include:
Drive-by Download, Phishing and Social Engineering, and
Spam [3]. Drive-by-download [4] refers to the (unintentional)
download of malware upon just visiting a URL. Such attacks
are usually carried out by exploiting vulnerabilities in plugins
or inserting malicious code through JavaScript. Phishing and
Social Engineering attacks [5] trick the users into revealing
private or sensitive information by pretending to be genuine
web pages. Spam is the usage of unsolicited messages for
the purpose of advertising or phishing. These types of attacks
occur in large numbers and have caused billions of dollars
worth of damage every year. Effective systems to detect such
malicious URLs in a timely manner can greatly help to
counter large number of and a variety of cyber-security threats.
Consequently, researchers and practitioners have worked to
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2Fig. 1. Example of a URL - “Uniform Resource Locator”
design effective solutions for Malicious URL Detection.
The most common method to detect malicious URLs de-
ployed by many antivirus groups is the black-list method.
Black-lists are essentially a database of URLs that have
been confirmed to be malicious in the past. This database is
compiled over time (often through crowd-sourcing solutions,
e.g. PhishTank [6]), as and when it becomes known that a
URL is malicious. Such a technique is extremely fast due to a
simple query overhead, and hence is very easy to implement.
Additionally, such a technique would (intuitively) have a very
low false-positive rate (although, it was reported that often
blacklisting suffered from non-trivial false-positive rates [7]).
However, it is almost impossible to maintain an exhaustive list
of malicious URLs, especially since new URLs are generated
everyday. Attackers use creative techniques to evade blacklists
and fool users by modifying the URL to “appear” legitimate
via obfuscation. Garera et. al. [8] identified four types of
obfuscation: Obfuscating the Host with an IP, Obfuscating the
Host with another domain, Obfuscating the host with large host
names, and misspelling. All of these try to hide the malicious
intentions of the website by masking the malicious URL.
Recently, with the increasing popularity of URL shortening
services, it has become a new and widespread obfuscation
technique (hiding the malicious URL behind a short URL) [9],
[10]. Once the URLs appear legitimate, and user’s visit them,
an attack can be launched. This is often done by malicious
code embedded into the JavaScript. Often the attackers will
also try to obfuscate the code so as to prevent signature based
tools from detecting them. Attackers use many other simple
techniques to evade blacklists including: fast-flux, in which
proxies are automatically generated to host the web-page; al-
gorithmic generation of new URLs; etc. Additionally, attackers
can often simultaneously launch more than one attack, which
alters the attack-signature, making it undetectable by tools that
focus on specific signatures. Blacklisting methods, thus have
severe limitations, and it appears almost trivial to bypass them,
especially due to the fact that blacklists are useless for making
predictions on new URLs.
To overcome these issues, in the last decade, researchers
have applied machine learning techniques for Malicious URL
Detection [3], [8], [11]–[17]. Machine Learning approaches,
use a set of URLs as training data, and based on the sta-
tistical properties, learn a prediction function to classify a
URL as malicious or benign. This gives them the ability to
generalize to new URLs unlike blacklisting methods. The
primary requirement for training a machine learning model
is the presence of training data. In the context of malicious
URL detection, this would correspond to a set of large number
of URLs. Machine learning can broadly be classified into
supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised, which corre-
spond to having the labels for the training data, not having the
labels, and having labels for limited fraction of training data.
Labels correspond to the knowledge that a URL is malicious
or benign.
After the training data is collected, the next step is to
extract informative features such that they sufficiently describe
the URL and at the same time, they can be interpreted
mathematically by machine learning models. For example,
simply using the URL string directly may not allow us to
learn a good prediction model (which in some extreme cases
may reduce the prediction model to a blacklist method). Thus,
one would need to extract suitable features based on some
principles or heuristics to obtain a good feature representation
of the URL. This may include lexical features (statistical
properties of the URL string, bag of words, n-gram, etc.), host-
based features (WHOIS info, geo-location properties of the
host, etc.), etc. These features after being extracted have to be
processed into a suitable format (e.g. a numerical vector), such
that they can be plugged into an off-the-shelf machine learning
method for model training. The ability of these features to
provide relevant information is critical to subsequent machine
learning, as the underlying assumption of machine learning
(classification) models is that the feature representations of
the malicious and benign URLs have different distributions.
Therefore, the quality of feature representation of the URLs is
critical to the quality of the resulting malicious URL predictive
model learned by machine learning.
Finally, using the training data with the appropriate fea-
ture representation, the next step in building the prediction
model is the actual training of the model. There are plenty
of classification algorithms can be directly used over the
training data (Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machine, Logistic
Regression, etc.). However, there are certain properties of
the URL data that may make the training difficult (both in
terms of scalability and learning the appropriate concept). For
example, the number of URLs available for training can be
in the order of millions (or even billions). As a result, the
training time for traditional models may be too high to be
practical. Consequently, Online Learning [18], a family of
scalable learning techniques have been heavily applied for
3this task. Similarly, for this task, URLs are represented using
the bag-of-words (BoW) features. These features basically
indicate whether a particular word (or string) appears in a
URL or not - as a result every possible type of word that may
appear in any URL becomes a feature. This representation
may result in millions of features which would be very sparse
(most features are absent most of the time, as a URL will
usually have very few of the millions of possible words present
in it). Accordingly, a learning method should exploit this
sparsity property to improve learning efficiency and efficacy.
Despite the promising generalizing ability of machine learning
approaches, one potential shortcoming of these approaches
for malicious URL detection may be their resource intensive
nature (especially while extracting features that are non-trivial
and expensive to compute), reducing their practical value when
requiring real-time security assurance compared to blacklisting
methods.
In this survey, we review the state-of-the-art machine learn-
ing techniques for malicious URL detection in literature.
We specifically focus on the contributions made for feature
representation and learning algorithm development in this
domain. We systematically categorize the various types of
feature representation used for creating the training data for
this task, and also categorize various learning algorithms used
to learn a good prediction model. We also discuss the open
research problems and identify directions for future research.
In the rest of the survey, we first discuss the broad categories
of strategies used for detecting malicious URLs - Blacklists,
Heuristic and Machine Learning. We formalize the setting as
a machine learning problem, where the primary requirement
is good feature representation and the learning algorithm used.
We then comprehensively present various types of feature
representation used for this problem. This is followed by
presenting various algorithms that have been used to solve
this task, and have been developed based on the properties of
URL data. Finally we discuss the newly emerging concept of
Malicious URL Detection as a service and the principles to
be used while designing such a system. We end the survey
by discussing the practical issues and open problems in this
domain.
II. MALICIOUS URL DETECTION
In this section, we first present the key principles used by
researchers and practitioner to solve the problem of Malicious
URL detection, followed by formalizing it as a machine
learning task.
A. Principles of Detecting Malicious URLs: An Overview
A variety of approaches have been attempted to tackle the
problem of Malicious URL Detection. According to the fun-
damental principles, these approaches can be broadly grouped
into two major categories: (i) Blacklisting or Heuristics, and
(ii) Machine Learning approaches [19], [20]. Below we briefly
describe the key principles of each category.
1) Blacklisting or Heuristic Approaches: Blacklisting ap-
proaches are a common and classical technique for detecting
malicious URLs, which often maintains a list of URLs that
are known to be malicious. Whenever a new URL is visited,
a database lookup is performed. If the URL is present in the
blacklist, it is considered to be malicious and then a warning
will be generated; else it is assumed to be benign. Blacklisting
suffers from the inability to maintain an exhaustive list of
all possible malicious URLs, as new URLs can be easily
generated daily, thus making it impossible for them to detect
new threats [21]. This is particularly of critical concern when
the attackers generate new URLs algorithmically, and can
thus bypass all blacklists. Despite several problems faced by
blacklisting [7], due to their simplicity and efficiency, they
continue to be one of the most commonly used techniques by
many anti-virus systems today.
Heuristic approaches [22] are some kind of extensions
of Blacklist based methods, wherein the idea is to create
a “blacklist of signatures”. Common attacks are identified,
and based on their behaviors, a signature is assigned to this
attack type. Intrusion Detection Systems can scan the web
pages for such signatures, and raise a flag if some suspicious
behavior is found. These methods have better generalization
capabilities than blacklisting, as they have the ability to detect
threats in new URLs as well. However, such methods can be
designed for only a limited number of common threats, and
can not generalize to all types of (novel) attacks. Moreover,
using obfuscation techniques, it is not difficult to bypass them.
A more specific version of heuristic approaches is through
analysis of execution dynamics of the webpage (e.g. [23]–
[27] etc.). Here also, the idea is to look for a signature of
malicious activity such as unusual process creation, repeated
redirection, etc. These methods necessarily require visiting the
webpage and thus the URLs actually can make an attack. As a
result, such techniques are often implemented in controlled en-
vironment like a disposable virtual machine. Such techniques
are very resource intensive, and require all execution of the
code (including the rich client sided code). Another drawback
is that websites may not launch an attack immediately after
being visited, and thus may go undetected.
2) Machine Learning: These approaches try to analyze
the information of a URL and its corresponding websites
or webpages, by extracting good feature representations of
URLs, and training a prediction model on training data of both
malicious and benign URLs. There are two-types of features
that can be used - static features, and dynamic features.
In static analysis, we perform the analysis of a webpage
based on information available without executing the URL
(i.e., executing JavaScript, or other code) [12], [13], [20],
[28]. The features extracted include lexical features from the
URL string, information about the host, and sometimes even
HTML and JavaScript content. Since no execution is required,
these methods are safer than the Dynamic approaches. The
underlying assumption is that the distribution of these features
is different for malicious and benign URLs. Using this distri-
bution information, a prediction model can be built, which
can make predictions on new URLs. Due to the relatively
safer environment to extracting important information, and
the ability to generalize to all types of threats (not just
common ones which have to be defined by a signature),
static analysis techniques have been extensively explored by
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applying machine learning techniques. In this survey, we focus
primarily on the static analysis techniques where machine
learning has found tremendous success. Dynamic analysis
techniques include monitoring the behavior of the systems
which are potential victims, to look for any anomaly. These
include [29] which monitor the system call sequences for
abnormal behavior, and [30] which mine internet access log
data for suspicious activity. Dynamic analysis techniques have
inherent risks, and are difficult to implement and generalize.
In the following, we formalize the problem of malicious
URL detection as a machine learning task which allows us to
generalize most of the existing work in literature. Alternate
problem settings will also be discussed in Section IV.
B. Problem Formulation
We formulate the problem of malicious URL detection as a
binary classification task for two-class prediction: “malicious”
versus “benign”. Specifically, given a data set with T URLs
{(u1, y1), . . . , (uT , yT )}, where ut for t = 1, . . . , T repre-
sents a URL from the training data, and yt ∈ {1,−1} is the
corresponding label where yt = 1 represents a malicious URL
and yt = −1 represents a benign URL. The crux to automated
malicious URL detection is two-fold:
1) Feature Representation: Extracting the appropriate fea-
ture representation: ut → xt where xt ∈ Rd is a d-
dimensional feature vector representing the URL; and
2) Machine Learning: Learning a prediction function f :
Rd → R which predicts the class assignment for any
URL instance x using proper feature presentations.
Consider a binary classification task, the goal of machine
learning for malicious URL detection is to maximize the
predictive accuracy. Both of the folds above are important to
achieve this goal. While the first part of feature representation
is often based on domain knowledge and heuristics, the second
part focuses on training the classification model via a data
driven optimization approach. Fig. 2 illustrates a general ar-
chitecture of solving Malicious URL Detection using machine
learning.
The first key step is to convert a URL u into a feature
vector x, where several types of information can be considered
and different techniques can be used. Unlike learning the
prediction model, this part cannot be directly computed by
a mathematical function (not for most of it). Using domain
knowledge and related expertise, a feature representation is
constructed by crawling all relevant information about the
URL. These range from lexical information (length of URL,
the words used in the URL, etc.) to host-based information
(WHOIS info, IP address, location, etc.). Once the information
is gathered, it is processed to be stored in a feature vector x.
Numerical features can be stored in x as is, and identity related
information or lexical features are usually stored through a
binarization or bag-of-words (BoW) approach. Based on the
type of information used, x ∈ Rd generated from a URL is
a d-dimensional vector where d can be less than 100 or can
be in the order of millions. A unique challenge that affects
this problem setting is that the number of features may not
be fixed or known in advance. For example, using a BoW
approach one can track the occurrence for every type of word
that may have occurred in a URL in our training data. A model
can be trained on this data, but while predicting, new URLs
may have words that did not occur in the training data. It is
thus a challenging task to design a good feature representation
that is robust to unseen data.
After obtaining the feature vector x for the training data,
to learn the prediction function f : Rd → R, it is usually
formulated as an optimization problem such that the detection
accuracy is maximized (or alternately, a loss function is
minimized). The function f is (usually) parameterized by a d−
dimensional weight vector w, such that f(x) = (w>x). Let
yˆt = sign(f(xt)) denote the class label prediction made by the
function f . The number of mistakes made by the prediction
model on the entire training data is given by:
∑T
t=1 Iyˆt=yt
where I is an indicator which evaluates to 1 if the condition
is true, and 0 otherwise. Since the indicator function is not
convex, the optimization can be difficult to solve. As a result,
a convex loss function is often defined, and is denoted by
`(f(x), y) and the entire optimization can be formulated as:
min
w
T∑
t=1
`(f(xt), yt) (1)
Several types of loss functions can be used, including the
popular hinge-loss `(f(x), y) = 12 max(1 − yf(x), 0), or
the squared-loss `(f(x), y) = 12 (f(x) − y)2. Sometimes, a
regularization term is often added to prevent over-fitting or to
learn sparse models, or the loss function can be modified based
on cost-sensitive nature of the data (e.g., class imbalanced
distribution, different costs for diverse threats).
In the following, we will discuss the existing studies on
feature representation for malicious URL detection and ap-
propriate machine learning algorithms design in detail.
5Fig. 3. Example of information about a URL that can be obtained in the Feature Collection stage
III. FEATURE REPRESENTATION
As stated earlier, the success of a machine learning model
critically depends on the quality of the training data, which
hinges on the quality of feature representation. Given a URL
u ∈ U, where U denotes a domain of any valid URL strings,
the goal of feature representation is to find a mapping g : U→
Rd, such that g(u) → x where x ∈ Rd is a d-dimensional
feature vector, that can be fed into machine learning models.
The process of feature representation can be further broken
down into two steps:
1) Feature Collection: This phase is engineering oriented,
which aims to collect most if not all relevant information
about the URL. This includes information such as pres-
ence of the URLs in a blacklist, the direct features of
the URL such as the URL String and information about
the host, the content of the web-site such as HTML and
JavaScript, popularity information, etc. Figure 3 gives an
example to demonstrate various types various types of
information that can be collected from a URL to obtain
the feature representation.
2) Feature Preprocessing: In this phase, the unstructured
information about the URL (e.g. textual description) is
appropriately formatted, and converted to a numerical
vector so that it can be fed into machine learning
algorithms. For example, the numerical information can
be used as is, and the BoW is used for representing
textual or lexical content. Besides, some data normal-
ization (e.g., Z-score normalization) may often be used
to handle the scaling issue.
For malicious URL detection, researchers have proposed
several types of features that can be used to provide use-
ful information. We categorize these features into: Blacklist
Features, URL-based Lexical Features, Host-based features,
Content-based Features, and Others (Context, Popularity, etc.).
All have their benefits and short-comings - while some are
very informative, obtaining these features can be very expen-
sive. Similarly, different features have different preprocessing
challenges and security concerns. Next, we will discuss each
of these feature categories in detail, followed by comparing
their pros and cons.
A. BlackList Features
As mentioned before, a trivial technique to identify mali-
cious URLs is to use blacklists. An existing URL as having
been identified as malicious (either through extensive analysis
or crowd sourcing) makes its way into the list. However, it has
been noted that blacklisting, despite its simplicity and ease of
implementation, suffers from nontrivial high false negatives
[7] due to the difficulty in maintaining exhaustive up-to-date
lists. Consequently, instead of using blacklist presence alone
as a decision maker, it can be used as a powerful feature. In
particular, [12] used the presence in a blacklist as a feature,
from 6 different blacklist service providers. They also analyzed
the effectiveness of these features compared to other features,
and observed that blacklist features alone did not have as good
a performance as other features, but when used in conjunction
with other features, the overall performance of the prediction
model improved.
[31] observed that to evade detection via blacklisting, many
attackers made minor modifications to the original URL. They
proposed to extend the blacklist by deriving new URLs based
on five heuristics including: Replacing Top-Level Domain
(TLDs), IP Address Equivalence, Directory Structure Simi-
larity, Query String substitution, and brand name equivalence.
Since, even a minor mismatch from the blacklist database can
cause a malicious URL to go undetected, they also devised an
6approximate matching solution. Similar heuristics potentially
could be used when deriving blacklist features for machine
learning approaches. A similar methodology was adopted for
automated URL blacklist generation by [32], [33]. [34] devel-
oped a method to proactively perform domain blacklisting.
B. Lexical Features
Lexical features are features obtained based on the prop-
erties of the URL name (or the URL string). The motivation
is that based on how the URL ”looks” it should be possible
to identify malicious nature of a URL. For example, many
obfuscation methods try to ”look” like benign URLs by
mimicking their names and adding a minor variation to it. In
practice, these lexical features are used in conjunction with
several other features (e.g. host-based features) to improve
model performance. However, using the original URL name
directly is not feasible from a machine learning perspective.
Instead, the URL string has to be processed to extract useful
features. Next we review some of the lexical features used for
malicious URL detection.
Traditional Lexical Features: The most commonly used
lexical features include statistical properties of the URL string,
like the length of the URL, length of each of the components
of the URL (Hostname, Top Level Domain, Primary domain,
etc.), the number of special characters, etc. [35] were one of
the first to suggest extracting words from the URL string. The
string was processed such that each segment delimited by a
special character (e.g. ”/”, ”.”, ”?”, ”=”, etc.) comprised a word.
Based on all the different types of words in all the URLs, a
dictionary was constructed, i.e., each word became a feature.
If the word was present in the URL, the value of the feature
would be 1, and 0 otherwise. This is also known as the bag-
of-words model.
Directly using the bag-of-words model, causes a loss of
information about the order in which the words occurred in
the URL. [12], [28] also used similar lexical features, but
they made the distinction between the tokens belonging to
the hostname, the path, the top-level domain and the primary
domain name. This was done by having a separate dictionary
for each of these segments. The distinction would allow for
preserving some of the order in which the words occurred. For
example, it allows us to distinguish between the presence of
”com” in the top-level domain vs other parts of the URL. [36]
try to enhance the lexical features by considering the usage
of bi-gram features, i.e., they construct a dictionary, where in
addition to single-words the presence of a set of 2-words in the
same URL is considered a feature. In addition, they record the
position of sensitive tokens and bigrams to exploit the token
context sensitivity.
The entire bag-of-word features approach can be viewed
as a form of machine learning compatible fuzzy blacklist
approach. Instead of focussing on the entire URL string, it
assigns scores to the URL based on smaller components of
the URL string. While this approach offers us an extensive
number of features, it can become problematic while running
sophisticated algorithms on them. For example, [28] collected
a dataset of 2 million URLs, having almost as many lexical
features. This number may grow even larger if bi-gram features
were considered. [35] considered n-gram features (same as
bi-gram, but n can be > 2), and devised a feature selection
scheme based on relative entropy to reduce the dimensionality.
A similar feature extraction method was used by [37], where
the feature weights were computed based on the ratio of their
presence in one class of URLs against their presence in both
classes of URLs.
In order to avoid being caught by blacklists, hackers can
generate malicious URLs algorithmically. Using bag-of-words
feature for such URLs is likely to give a poor performance,
as algorithmically generated URLs may produce never before
seen words (hence never before seen features). To detect
such algorithmically generated malicious URLs, [38] analyzed
character level strings to obtain the features. They argued that
algorithmically generated domain names and those generated
by humans would have a substantially different alpha-numeric
distribution. Further, since the number of characters is small,
the number of features obtained would also be small. They
performed their analysis based on KL-divergence, Jaccard
Coefficient, and Edit-distance using unigram and bigram dis-
tributions of characters.
Advanced Lexical Features: Traditional lexical features were
directly obtained from the URL string without significant
domain knowledge or computation. Researchers have proposed
several advanced lexical features that exploit properties of
URL strings, to get more informative features.
[39] derive new lexical features using heuristics with
the objective of being obfuscation resistant. Based on the
obfuscation types identified by [8], five categories of features
are proposed: URL-related features (keywords, length, etc.),
Domain features (length of domain name, whether IP address
is used as domain name, etc.), Directory related features
(length of directory, number of subdirectory tokens, etc.), File
name features (length of filename, number of delimiters, etc.),
and Argument Features(length of the argument, number of
variables, etc.).
Another feature is based on the Kolmogorov Complexity
[40]. Kolmogorov Complexity is a measure of complexity of a
string s. Conditional Kolmogorov Complexity is the measure
of the complexity of a string s given another string for free.
This means that the presence of the free string does not add to
the complexity of the original input string s. Based on this, for
a given URL, we compute the URL’s Conditional Kolmogorov
Complexity with respect to the set of Benign URLs and the set
of Malicious URLs. Combining these measures we get a sense
of whether the given URL is more similar to the Malicious
URL database or the Benign URL database. This feature,
though useful, may not be easy to scale up to very large
number of URLs. [41], [42] define a new concept of intra-
URL relatedness which is a measure to quantify the relations
between different words that comprise the URL with specific
focus on relationship between the registered domain and the
rest of the URL. [43] propose new distance based metrics,
called domain brand name distance and path brand name
distance. These are essentially types of edit distance between
strings aimed at detecting those malicious URLs which try to
mimic popular brands or websites.
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Host-based features are obtained from the host-name prop-
erties of the URL [28]. They allow us to know the location
of malicious hosts, the identity of the malicious hosts, and the
management style and properties of these hosts.
[11] studied the impact of a few host-based features on the
maliciousness of URLs. Some of the key observations were
that phishers exploited Short URL services; the time-to-live
from registration of the domain was almost immediate for the
malicious URLs; and many used botnets to host themselves
on multiple machines across several countries. Consequently,
host-based features became an important element in detecting
malicious URLs.
[12], [28] borrowed ideas from [11] and proposed the usage
of several host-based features including: IP Address properties,
WHOIS information, Location, Domain Name Properties, and
Connection Speed. The IP Address properties comprise fea-
tures obtained from IP address prefix and autonomous system
(AS) number. This included whether the IPs of A, MX or
NS records are in the same ASes or prefixes as one another.
The WHOIS information comprises domain name registration
dates, registrars and registrants. The Location information
comprises the physical Geographic Location - e.g. country/city
to which the IP address belongs. The Domain Name properties
comprise time-to-live values, presence of certain keywords like
”client” and ”server”, if the IP address is in the host name
or not and does the PTR record resolve one of the host’s
IP addresses. Since many of the features are identity related
information, a bag-of-words like approach is required to store
them in a numerical vector, where each word corresponds to
a specific identity. Like the lexical features, adopting such
an approach leads to a large number of features. For the
2 million URLs, [28] obtained over a million host-based
features. Exclusive usage of IP Address Features has also been
considered [44]. IP Address Features are arguably more stable,
as it is difficult to obtain new IP Addresses for malicious URLs
continuously. Due to this stability, they serve as important fea-
tures in malicious URL detection. However, it is cumbersome
to use IP Address directly. Instead, it is proposed to extract
IP Address features based on a binarization or categorization
approach through which octet-based, extended-octet based and
bit-string based features are generated.
DNS Fluxiness features were proposed to look for malicious
URLs that would hide their identity by using proxy networks
and quickly changing their host [45], [46]. [43] define domain
age and domain confidence (dependent on similarity with a
white-list) level which help determine the fluxiness nature of
the URL (e.g. malicious URLs using fast flux will have a small
domain age). [47] propose new features to detect malicious
URLs that are hidden within trusted sites. They extract header
features from HTTP response headers. They also use the age
obtained from the time stamp value of the last modified header.
[48] propose Application Layer features and Network Layer
features to devise a cross-layer mechanism to detect malicious
URLs. [49] suggest the usage of temporal variation patterns
based on active analysis of DNS logs, to help discover domain
names that could be abused in the future.
D. Content-based Features
Content-based features are those obtained upon download-
ing the entire web-page. As compared to URL-based features,
these are ”heavy-weight”, as a lot of information needs to be
extracted, and at the same time, safety concerns may arise.
However, with more information available about a particular
web-page, it is natural to assume that it would lead to a better
prediction model. Further, if the URL-based features fail to
detect a malicious URL, a more thorough analysis of the
content-based features may help in early detection of threats
[19]. The content-based features of a web-page can be drawn
primarily from its HTML content, and the usage of JavaScript.
[50] categorize the content based features of a web-page into
5 broad segments: Lexical features, HTML Document Level
Features, JavaScript features, ActiveX Objects and feature
relationships. [51], [52] proposed CANTINA and its variants
for detecting phishing websites using a comprehensive feature-
based machine learning approach, by exploiting various fea-
tures from the HTML Document Object Model (DOM), search
engines and third party services. In the following we discuss
some of these categories, primarily focusing on the HTML
Document Level Features and JavaScript Features.
1) HTML Features: [50] proposed the usage of lexical
features from the HTML of the web-page. These are relatively
easy to extract and preprocess. At the next level of complexity,
the HTML document level features can be used. The document
level features correspond to the statistical properties of the
HTML document, and the usage of specific types of function-
ality. [50] propose the usage of features like: length of the doc-
ument, average length of the words, word count, distinct word
count, word count in a line, the number of NULL characters,
usage of string concatenation, unsymmetrical HTML tags, the
link to remote source of scripts, and invisible objects. Often
malicious code is encrypted in the HTML, which is linked to a
large word length, or heavy usage of string concatenation, and
thus these features can help in detecting malicious activity.
Similar features with minor variations were used by many of
the subsequent researchers including [46] (number of iframes,
number of zero size iframes, number of lines, number of
hyperlinks, etc.). [19] also used similar features, and addition-
ally proposed to use several more descriptive features which
were aimed at minor statistical properties of the page. These
include features such as number of elements with a small area,
number of elements with suspicious content (suspiciousness
was determined by the length of the content between the
start and end tag), number of out of place elements, presence
of double documents, etc. [53] developed a delta method,
where delta represented the change in different versions of
the website. They analyzed whether the change was malicious
or benign.
2) JavaScript Features: [50] argue that several JavaScript
functions are commonly used by hackers to encrypt malicious
code, or to execute unwanted routines without the client’s
permission. For example extensive usage of function eval()
and unescape() may indicate execution of encrypted code
within the HTML. They aim to use the count of 154 native
JavaScript functions as features to identify malicious URLs.
8[46] identify a subset (seven) of these native JavaScript
functions that are often in Cross-site scripting and Web-based
malware distribution. These include: escape(), eval(), link(),
unescape(), exec(), and search() functions. [19] propose ad-
ditional heuristic JavaScript features including: keywords-to-
words ratio, number of long strings, presence of decoding rou-
tines, shell code presence probability, number of direct string
assignments, number of DOM-modifying functions, number
of event attachments, number of suspicious object names,
number of suspicious strings, number of ”iframe” strings and
number of suspicious string tags. In [54], the authors try
to detect JavaScript Obfuscation by analyzing the JavaScript
codes using n-gram, Entropy and Word Size. n-gram and word
size are commonly used to look for character/word distribution
and presence for long strings. For Entropy of the strings, they
observe that obfuscated strings tend to have a lower entropy.
More recently, [55] applied deep learning techniques to learn
feature representations from JavaScript code.
3) Visual Features: There have also been attempts made
at using images of the webpages to identify the malicious
nature of the URL. Most of these focus on computing visual
similarity with protected pages, where the protected pages
refer to genuine websites. Finding a high level of visual
similarity of a suspected malicious URL could be indicative
of an attempt at phishing. One of the earliest attempts at
using visual features for this task was by computing the
Earth Mover’s Distance between 2 images [56]. [57], [58]
addressed the same problem and developed a system to extract
visual features of web pages based on text-block features
and image-block features (using information such as block
size, color, etc.). More advanced computer vision technologies
were adapted for this task. Contrast Context Histogram (CCH)
features were suggested [59], and so were Scale Invariant
Feature Transform (SIFT) features [60]. Another approach
using visual feature was developed by [61], where an OCR
was used to read the text in the image of the webpage.
[62] combine both textual and visual features for measuring
similarity. With recent advances in Deep Learning for Image
Recognition [63], [64], it may be possible to extract more
powerful and effective visual features.
4) Other Content-based Features: [50] argued that due to
the powerful functionality of ActiveX objects, they can be used
to create malicious DHTML pages. Thus, they tried to com-
pute frequency for each of eight ActiveX objects. Examples
include: “Scripting.FileSystemObject” which can be used for
file system I/O operations, “WScript.Shell” which can execute
shell scripts on the client’s computer, and “Adodb.Stream”
which can download files from the Internet. [65] try to find
the identity and keywords in the DOM text and evaluate the
consistency between the identity observed and the identity it is
potentially trying to mimic which is found by searching. [66]
used the directory structure of the websites to obtain insights.
E. Other Features
Recent years have seen the growth of Short URL service
providers, which provide the original URL to be represented
by a shorter string. This enables sharing of the URLs in on
social media platforms like twitter, where the originally long
URLs would not fit within the 140 character limit of a tweet.
Unfortunately, this has also become a popular obfuscation
technique for the malicious URLs. While the Short URL
service providers try their best to not generate short URLs
for the malicious ones, they struggle to do an effective job as
they also rely primarily on blacklists [67], [68]. As a result, a
recently emerging research direction has become active where
context-features of the URL are obtained, i.e., the features of
the background information where the URL has been shared.
[69] use context information derived from the tweets where
the URL was shared. [70] used click traffic data to classify
short URLs as malicious or not. [71] propose forwarding based
features to combat forwarding-based malicious URLs. [72]
propose another direction of features to identify malicious
URLs - they also focus on URLs shared on social media, and
aim to identify the malicious nature of a URL by performing
behavioral analysis of the users who shared them, and the
users who clicked on them. These features are formally
called ”Posting-based” features and ”Click-based” features.
[10] approach this problem with a systematic categorization
of context features which include content-related features
(lexical and statistical properties of the tweet), context of the
tweet features (time, relevance, and user mentions) and social
features (following, followers, location, tweets, retweets and
favorite count).
Some other features used were designed heuristics to mea-
sure the popularity of the URL. One of the earliest approaches
to applying statistical techniques to detect malicious URLs
[8] aimed at probabilistically identifying the importance of
specific hand-designed features. These include Page-based fea-
tures (Page rank, quality, etc.), Domain-based features (pres-
ence in white domain table), Type-based features (obfuscation
types) and Word-based features(presence of keywords such as
”confirm”, ”banking”, etc.). [73] use both the URL-based and
content based features, and additionally record the initial URL,
the landing URL and the redirect chain. Further they record
the number of popups and the behavior of plugins, which have
been commonly used by spammers. [46] proposed the usage
of new categories of features: Link Popularity and Network
Features. Link Popularity is scored on the basis of incoming
links from other webpages. This information was obtained
from different search engines. In order to make the usage
of these features robust to manipulation, they also propose
the usage of certain metrics that validate the quality of the
links. They also use a metric to detect spam-to-spam URL
links. For their work, they use these features in conjunction
with lexical features content-based feature, and host-based
features. [20] used social reputation features of URLs by
tracking their public share count on Facebook and Twitter. [74]
incorporated information on redirection chains into redirection
graphs, which provided insight into detecting malicious URLs.
[42] use search engine query data to mine for word relatedness
measurement.
F. Summary of Feature Representations
There is a wide variety of information that can be obtained
for a URL. Crawling the information and transforming the
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feature vector can be very resource intensive. While extra
information can improve predictive models (subject to appro-
priate regularization), it is often not practical to obtain a lot of
features. For example, several host-based features may take
a few seconds to be obtained, and that itself makes using
them in real world setting impractical. Another example is the
Kolmogorov Complexity - which requires comparing a URL
to several malicious and benign URLs in a database, which is
infeasible for comparing with billions of URLs. Accordingly,
care must be taken while designing a Malicious URL Detec-
tion System to tradeoff the usefulness of a feature and the
difficulty in retrieving it. We present a subjective evaluation
of different features used in literature. Specifically, we evaluate
them on the basis of Collection Difficulty, Associated Security
Risks, need for an external dependency to acquire information,
the associated time cost with regard to feature collection and
feature preprocessing, and the dimensionality of the features
obtained.
Collection difficulty is refers to the engineering effort
required to obtain specific information about the features.
Blacklist, context and popularity features require additional
dependencies and thus have a higher collection overhead,
whereas the other features are directly obtained from the URL
itself. This also implies, that for a live-system (i.e. real-time
Malicious URL Detection), obtaining features with a high col-
lection time may be infeasible. In terms of associated security
risks, the content-features have the highest risk, as potential
malware may be explicitly downloaded while trying to obtain
these features, while other features do not suffer from these
issues. The collection time of the blacklist features can be high
if the external dependency has to be queried during runtime,
however, if the the entire blacklist can be stored locally, the
collection overhead is very small. Collection of the lexical
features is very efficient, as they are basically direct derivatives
of the URL string. Host-based features are relatively time-
consuming to obtain. Content-features usually require down-
loading the web-page which would affect the feature collection
time. For preprocessing, once the data has been collected,
deriving the features in most cases is computationally very
fast. For dimensionality size, the lexical features have a very
high-dimensionality (and so do unstructured Host-features and
content features). This is largely because they are all stored as
Bag-of-Words features. This feature size consequently affects
the training and test-time. These properties are summarized
in Table I. We also categorize the representative references
according to the feature representation used, in Table II.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS FOR
MALICIOUS URL DETECTION
There is a rich family of machine learning algorithms in
literature, which can be applied for solving malicious URL
detection. After converting URLs into feature vectors, many
of these learning algorithms can be generally applied to
train a predictive model in a fairly straightforward manner.
However, to effectively solve the problem, some efforts have
also been explored in devising specific learning algorithms
that either exploit the properties exhibited by the training
data of Malicious URLs, or address some specific challenges
which the application faces. In this section, we categorize and
review the learning algorithms that have been applied for this
task, and also suggest suitable machine learning technologies
that can be used to solve specific challenges encountered.
We categorize the learning algorithms into: Batch Learning
Algorithms, Online Algorithms, Representation Learning, and
Others. Batch Learning algorithms work under the assumption
that the entire training data is available prior to the training
task. Online Learning algorithms treat the data as a stream of
instances, and learn a prediction model by sequentially making
predictions and updates. This makes them extremely scalable
compared to batch algorithms. Next, we discuss representation
learning methods, which in the context of Malicious URL
Detection are largely concentrated towards feature selection
techniques. Lastly, we discuss other learning algorithms, in
challenges specific to Malicious URL Detection are addressed,
including cost-sensitive learning, active learning, similarity
learning, unsupervised learning and string pattern matching.
A. Batch Learning
Following the previous problem setting, consider a URL
data set with T URLs {(u1, y1), . . . , (uT , yT )}, where ut ∈ U
for t ∈ 1, . . . , T represents a URL from the training data,
and yt ∈ {1,−1} is its class label where y = 1 indicates a
malicious URL and y = −1 indicates a benign URL. Using
an appropriate feature representation scheme (g : U 7→ Rd)
as discussed in the previous section, one can map a URL
instance into a d-dimensional feature vector, i.e., g(ui)→ xi.
As a result, one can apply any existing learning algorithm that
can work with vector space data to train a predictive model
for malicious URL detection tasks. In this section we review
the most common popular batch learning algorithms that have
been applied for Malicious URL Detection.
A popular family of batch learning algorithms can be
categorized under a discriminative learning framework using
regularized loss minimization as:
min
f
T∑
t=1
`(f(xt), yt) + λR(w) (2)
where f(xt) can be either a linear model, e.g., f(xt) = w·xt+
b, or some nonlinear models (kernel-based or neural networks),
`(f(xt), yt) is some loss function to measure the difference
between the model’s prediction f(xt) and the true class label
y,R(w) is a regularization term to prevent overfitting, and λ is
a regularization parameter to trade-off model complexity and
simplicity. In the following, we discuss two popular learning
algorithms under this framework: Support Vector Machines
and Logistic Regression.
1) Support Vector Machine: (SVM) is one of most popular
supervised learning methods. It exploits the structural risk
minimization principle using a maximum margin learning
approach, which essentially can be viewed as a special instance
of the regularized loss minimization framework. Specifically,
by choosing the hinge loss as the loss function and maximiz-
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TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENT FEATURE REPRESENTATIONS FOR MALICIOUS URL DETECTION
Features Category Criteria
Collection External Collection Processing Feature
Difficulty Risk Dependency Time Time Size
Blacklist Blacklist Moderate Low Yes Moderate Low Low
Lexical Traditional Easy Low No Low Low Very HighAdvanced Easy Low No Low High Low
Host Unstructured Easy Low No High Low Very HighStructured Easy Low No High Low Low
Content
HTML Easy High No Depends Low High
JavaScript Easy High No Depends Low Moderate
Visual Easy High No Depends High High
Other Easy High No Depends Low Low
Others Context Difficult Low Yes High Low LowPopularity Difficult Low Yes High Low Low
TABLE II
REPRESENTATIVE REFERENCES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF FEATURES USED BY RESEARCHERS IN LITERATURE
Feature Sub Category Representative References
Blacklist Blacklist [8], [12], [31]–[34]
Lexical Lexical [8], [12], [13], [19], [20], [28], [35]–[43], [46], [48], [62], [73], [75]–[91]
Host Host-based [11]–[13], [17], [19], [28], [44]–[46], [46]–[48], [73], [76], [77], [80], [85]
Content
HTML [2], [19], [20], [22], [46], [48], [50], [73], [78], [79], [83], [84], [90], [92]–[95]
JavaScript [2], [4], [19], [20], [26], [48], [50], [54], [55], [73], [83], [84], [94]
Visual [56]–[62], [79], [96]
Others [50], [65], [66], [94]
Others Context-based [10], [16], [69]–[72], [97]Popularity-based [8], [20], [42], [46], [73], [77], [83], [84], [98]–[102]
ing the margin, SVM can be formulated into the following
optimization:
(w, b)← arg min
w,b
1
T
T∑
t=1
max(0, 1− yt(w · xt + b)) + λ‖w‖22
In addition, SVM can learn nonlinear classifiers using kernels
[103]. SVMs are probably one of the most commonly used
classifiers for Malicious URL Detection in literature [10], [12],
[35], [40]–[43], [47], [48], [50], [69], [70], [79], [81], [92],
[93].
2) Logistic Regression: is another well-known discrimina-
tive model which computes the conditional probability for a
feature vector x to be classified as a class y = 1 by
P (y = 1|x;w, b) = σ(w · x+ b) = 1
1 + e−(w·x+b)
(3)
Based on the maximum-likelihood estimation (equivalently
defining the loss function as the negative log likelihood), the
optimization of logistic regression can be formulated as
(w, b)← arg min
w,b
1
T
T∑
t=1
− logP (yt|xt;w, b) + λR(w) (4)
where the regularization term can be either L2-norm R(w) =
||w||2 or L1-norm R(w) = ||w||1 for achieving a sparse
model for high-dimensional data. Logistic Regression has been
a popular learning method for Malicious URL Detection [8],
[12], [19], [48], [50], [70], [79].
Other commonly used supervised learning algorithms fo-
cus on feature-wise analysis to obtain the prediction model.
These include the Naive Bayes Classifier which computes
the posterior probability of the class label assuming feature
independence, and Decision Tree which adopts a greedy
approach to constructing if-else rules based on the features
offering the best splitting criteria.
3) Naive Bayes: is a generative model for classification,
which is “naive” in the sense that this model assumes all
features of x are independent of each other. Specifically,
let P (x|y) denote the conditional probability of the feature
vector given a class, the independence assumption implies that
P (x|y) = Πdi=1P (xi|y), where d is the number of features. By
applying the Bayes Theorem, one can compute the posterior
probability that a feature vector x is a malicious URL by
P (y = 1|x) = P (x|y = 1)
P (x|y = 1) + P (x|y = −1) (5)
Naive Bayes has been used for Malicious URL Detection by
[19], [48], [50], [62], [71], [97].
4) Decision Trees: is one of most popular methods for
inductive inference and has a major advantage of its highly
interpretable decision tree classification models which can also
been converted into a rule set for human readability. Decision
Trees have been used for malicious URL/web classification by
[10], [12], [19], [22], [41], [42], [44], [48], [70], [71], [80],
[97]. A closely related approach which gives us rules in the
form of If-then was applied in using Associative Classification
mining by [104].
5) Others and Ensembles: In addition to the above,
other recently proposed approaches include applying Extreme
Learning Machines (ELM) for classifying the phishing web
sites using ELM by combining hybrid features in [105], and
the spherical classification approach that allows batch learning
models to be suitable for a large number of instances [106].
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Beyond the binary classification approaches, [46] formulated
the problem of malicious URL detection as a multi-label
classification task. The argument for the need of multi-label
classification is that different attacks have varying degrees
of threats. For example, a spam URL is not as deadly as a
malware infection. They proposed a two-step method: first
using SVM for classifying a URL as malicious or benign; and
second, performing multi-label classification on the malicious
URLs using some popular multi-label learning methods (e.g.,
RAkEL and ML-kNN).
In addition, there are quite a few malicious ULR detection
approaches using ensemble learning methods. For example,
[107] applied Adaboost for detecting phishing websites using
a content-based approaching together with Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) for topic modeling. [20] employed an en-
semble of multiple classifiers to make a weighted prediction.
They independently train Decision Trees, Random Forests,
Bayesian classifiers, Support Vector Machines and Logistic
Regression, and design a confidence weighted majority voting
scheme to make the final prediction. [87] adopt a multi-
view analysis where a logistic regression model is trained
on different portions of the URL lexical features, and their
optimal combination is learnt. [83], [84] adopt an evolutionary
optimization method to search for the best combination of
features and models to obtain the final ensemble. In practice,
ensemble learning is a common and very successful learning
strategy when there is a need for boosting the predictive
performance.
Although batch learning algorithms are popular and easy
to use, they can suffer from several major limitations when
dealing with real-world malicious URL detection tasks. For
example, batch learning methods often suffer from expen-
sive retraining cost when the new training data may arrive
frequently. Moreover, due to expensive retraining cost, batch
learning algorithms often do not update the model frequently,
making them difficult to capture some emerging threats in
a timely way. Last but not least, batch learning methods
may poorly adapt to the concept drift due to their nature of
batch training. To address these limitations, online learning
algorithms have been emerging as a promising direction for
resolving the Malicious URL Detection tasks.
B. Online Learning
Online Learning represents a family of efficient and
scalable learning algorithms that learn from data sequen-
tially [18], [108]. Consider malicious URL detection, given
a sequence of T labeled instances, denoted by D =
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT )}, where xt ∈ Rd denotes the URL’s
feature representation, and yt ∈ {−1,+1} is the class label.
y = +1 denotes a malicious URL, and yt = −1 denotes
a benign URL. At each iteration t, the algorithm makes a
prediction f(xt) = sgn(w · xt) where w is a d-dimensional
weight vector initialized to 0 at t = 0. After the prediction, the
true class label yt is revealed to the learner, and based on the
loss suffered, the learner makes an update of the model in order
to improve predictions in the future. The general framework
of an online learning algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: The Online Learning Procedure
Initialize the prediction function as w1 = 0;
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Receive instance: xt ∈ Rd;
Predict yˆt = ft(xt)(= sign(w>t xt) for binary
classification);
Receive correct label: yt ∈ {−1,+1};
Suffer loss: `t(wt), which depends on the difference
between w>t xt and yt;
Update the prediction function wt to wt+1;
end for
Online learning algorithms are often much more scalable than
traditional batch learning algorithms. Both the learning (model
updates) and forecasting are computationally very efficient,
making it especially suitable for malicious URL detection
tasks with increasingly large amounts of training data (often
with millions of instances and millions of features), where
batch learning algorithms may suffer due to their expensive re-
training and the high memory and computational constraints.
Online learning algorithms are often developed with strong
theoretical guarantees such that they are able to asymptotically
learn the prediction models as good as the batch algorithms
under mild assumptions.
Online learning has been actively explored and applied to
resolve the malicious URL Detection tasks [28]. In the fol-
lowing, we categorize the existing online learning algorithms
roughly into two major categories: (i) First-order online algo-
rithms, and (ii) Second-order online algorithms, and highlight
some important concerns for their applications to malicious
URL detection.
1) First Order Online Learning: First-order algorithms
learn by updating the weight vector w for classification
sequentially by utilizing only the first-order information with
training data. We briefly describe some popular first-order
online algorithms applied to Malicious URL Detection.
Perceptron [109] is the earliest online learning algorithm. In
each iteration, whenever a mistake is made by the prediction
model, Perceptron makes an update as follows:
wt+1 ← wt + ytxt (6)
Online Gradient Descent (OGD) [110] updates the weight
vector w by applying the (Stochastic) Gradient Descent prin-
ciple only to a single training instance arriving sequentially.
Specifically, OGD makes an online update iteratively as:
wt+1 ← wt − η∇`(wt,xt; yt) (7)
where η is a step size parameter, and `(wt,xt; yt) is some
predefined loss function, e.g., Hinge-Loss, Negative Log-
Likelihood, Squared Loss, etc.
Passive-Aggressive learning (PA) [111] is an online learning
method that trades off two concerns: (i) passiveness: to avoid
the new model deviating too much from the existing one,
and (ii) aggressiveness: to update the model by correcting the
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prediction mistake as much as possible. The optimization of
PA learning can be cast as follows:
wt+1 ← argmin
w
1
2
||wt −w||2 subject to yt(w · xt) ≥ 1 (8)
The closed-form solution to the above can be derived as the
following update rule:
wt+1 ← wt + τtytxt
where τt = max
( 1−yt(wt·xt)
||xt||2 , 0
)
(9)
The above model assumes a hard margin exists, that is, data
can be linearly separable, which may not be always true,
especially when data is noisy. To overcome this limitation,
soft-margin PA variants, such as PA-I and PA-II, are often
commonly used, which also have closed-form solutions [111].
The above first-order online learning algorithms have been
widely applied for malicious URL detection tasks in literature
[13], [28], [37], [73], [112], which are efficient, scalable,
simple to understand, and easy to implement.
2) Second Order Online Learning: Unlike the first order
online learning, second order online learning aims to boost
the learning efficacy by exploiting second-order information,
e.g., the second order statistics of underlying distributions. For
example, they usually assume the weight vector w follows a
Gaussian distribution w ∼ N (µ,Σ) with mean vector µ ∈ Rd
and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d. This is particularly useful
for malicious URL Detection where data is sparse and high
dimensional (due to the bag-of-words or alike representations
of lexical features). Below we briefly describe some popular
second-order algorithms applied to Malicious URL Detection.
Confidence-Weighted learning (CW) [113] is similar to the
PA learning algorithms in terms of passiveness and aggres-
siveness tradeoff, except that CW exploits the second-order
information. In particular, CW learning maintains a different
confidence measure for each individual feature, such that
weights of lower confidence will be updated more aggressively
than those of higher confidence. Specifically, by modeling
the weight vector as a Gaussian distribution, CW trades off
between (i) passiveness: to avoid the new distribution of the
model from deviating too much from the existing one; and (ii)
aggressiveness: to update the model by not only correcting the
prediction mistake if any, but also improving the classification
confidence. More specifically, the CW learning can be cast
into the following optimization:
(µt+1,Σt+1)← argmin
µ,Σ
DKL(N (µ,Σ)||N (µt,Σt)) (10)
subject to yt(µ,xt) ≥ φ−1(η)
√
x>t Σxt (11)
Like the PA algorithms, the closed-form solutions for the
CW optimization can be derived. CW algorithms have been
applied for detecting malicious URLs by [28], [36].
CW online learning and its variants have been explored for
malicious URL detection in literature. For example, [76] ap-
plied the CW learning for malicious URL detection by improv-
ing the efficiency when exploiting the full covariance matrix
for high-dimensional features, which uses an approximation
technique to accelerate the covariance computation (although
it may be still quite slow for very high-dimensional data).
Further, Adaptive Regularization of Weights (AROW) [114],
an improved CW learning algorithm, for learning with non-
separable data, was also used for Malicious URL Detection
in [39]. [85] adopted a hybrid online learning technique by
combining both CW and PA algorithms. Specifically, CW is
used for learning from purely lexical features (e.g., bag of
words), and PA is used for learning from descriptive features
(e.g., statistical properties of the lexical features). They assume
lexical features are more effective at detecting maliciousness,
while they could change frequently (short-lived), whereas
descriptive properties are more stable and static.
Besides, there are many other kinds of online learning al-
gorithms (both first-order and second-order) in literature [18],
which may also be applicable to Malicious URL Detection,
but yet to be extensively studied.
3) Cost-Sensitive Online Learning: Unlike a regular binary
classification task, Malicious URL Detection often faces the
challenges of imbalanced label distribution (i.e., different
number of malicious and benign URLs), and also a differential
misclassification cost (malware installation is much more sever
than a simple spam). Accordingly, the designed learning algo-
rithms have to account for this differential misclassification
rate in the optimization problem. There have been several
algorithms in literature (for both batch and online settings)
which address this issue. An example is Cost-Sensitive Online
Learning [115]–[120]. While traditional online learning algo-
rithms simply optimize the classification accuracy or mistake
rate (which could be misleading for an extremely imbalanced
data set since a trivial algorithm that declares every URL
as benign may achieve a very high accuracy), cost-sensitive
online learning aims to optimize either one of two cost-
sensitive measures: sum and cost, where sum is a weighted
combination of specificity and sensitivity, and cost is the
weighted summation of misclassification costs on positive and
negative instances. By defining cost-sensitive loss functions,
cost-sensitive online learning algorithms can be derived by
applying the similar techniques (e.g., online gradient descent).
4) Online Active Learning: Traditional supervised learning
(either batch or online) methods often assume labels of training
data can always be obtained by the learners at no cost. This
is not realistic in real systems since labeling data can be quite
expensive and time-consuming. Online Active Learning aims
to develop an online learning algorithm for training a model
that queries the label of an incoming unlabeled URL instance
only if there is a need (e.g., according to some uncertainty
measure) [121]–[123]. Typically, an active learner works in
an online learning manner for a real system. For example,
[116], [121] proposed a cost-sensitive online active learning
(CSOAL) approach for Malicious URL detection, where the
online learner decides to query the label on the fly for an
incoming unlabeled URL instance, such that the label will be
queried only when the classification confidence of the URL
instance is low or equivalently there is a high uncertainty for
making a correct prediction.
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C. Representation Learning
There are a large number and variety of features used for
Malicious URL Detection. In particular, the usage of Bag
of Words features for many of the feature categories results
in millions of features. Moreover, as the number of URLs
to be processed increases (which is the case in the real
world setting), the number of features keeps growing as well.
Learning prediction models using so many features suffers
from two main drawbacks:
• Computationally Expensive: Training and test time be-
come significantly high, not only because of the many
mathematical operations to be performed, but also be-
cause of collecting and preprocessing so many features.
In many cases (e.g. using bi-gram and tri-gram features),
we obtain so many features that it is practically infeasible
to perform any optimization.
• Noisy Models: Malicious URL Detection often exhibits
number of features being larger than the number of
instances available for training. Optimizing such models
may result in overfitting.
To overcome these problems, researchers in both ma-
chine learning and cyber-security have proposed representation
learning techniques, which in the context of Malicious URL
Detection are mostly concentrated in the domain of feature
selection techniques, i.e., the optimal subset of the given rep-
resentation needs to be learnt. Here we discuss two categories
of representation learning: feature selection, where the features
are evaluated and selected based on their performance, and
sparsity regularization, where the feature selection is implicitly
done by incorporating it into the objective function.
1) Feature Selection: There are two categories of feature
selection where the features are scored on the basis of their
performance and accordingly selection. These are Filter Meth-
ods and Wrapper Methods [124], [125].
Filter methods usually use a statistical measure to evaluate
the suitability of a particular feature. Based on this score, a set
of features can be selected (and the poor features are filtered
out). In most cases, this evaluation is done independently
(i.e., independent of other features). Some popular approaches
include the Chi squared test (χ2) [92], [126] and information
gain scores [35], [127], [128].
Wrapper methods try to select the best subset of features, by
modeling the feature selection as a search problem. Different
subsets of features are used to learn a prediction model, and are
evaluated based on their performance [129], [130]. [131] use
Genetic Algorithms to perform feature selection and divides
the features into critical and non-critical. The critical features
are used as is, while projection of the non-critical features are
used to provide supplementary information, instead of being
discarded. [125] adopt a maximum relevance and minimum
redundancy criterion to select a robust subset of features.
2) Sparsity Regularization: Due to a large number of fea-
tures that are collected, in particular, lexical features, feature
selection needs to be performed over millions of features. Ap-
plying filter and wrapper methods may not be very practical.
Feature selection can be induced by appropriately modifying
the objective function, i.e., (also called Embedded methods)
to embed the feature selection into the optimization. Consider
the generic optimization problem discussed before:
min
f
T∑
t=1
`(f(xt), yt) + λR(w)
where the first term aims to optimize the model perfor-
mance, and the second term is the regularizer. λ is the tradeoff
parameter to regulate the effect of regularization. A common
technique to induce feature selection (or alternately learn
sparse models), is to use the L1-norm regularizer:
R(w) = ||w||1 (12)
Unlike other popular regularizers (like L2-norm), which try to
reduce model complexity, L1-regularization encourages zero
values in the weight vector w, which results in the corre-
sponding features to not be selected for the final prediction
model. This approach has been commonly used in conjunction
with SVM and Logistic Regression models [73] in the batch
setting. From the perspective of Online Setting, Sparse Online
Learning [132], [133] has been developed to learn sparse
models for high-dimensional sparse data (as exhibited in URL
features that are very sparse and in the order of millions).
[134], [135] proposed Online Feature Selection as a principled
way for feature selection in an online learning manner, which
aims to bound the number of selected features based on
some given budget based on the first order online learning
approaches. There is also a second-order Online Feature
Selection approach [136].
D. Other Learning Methods
While most of the algorithms used for Malicious URL
Detection take the form of binary classification, other prob-
lem settings have also been studied. Some of these settings
are designed for problems specifically arising in Malicious
URL Detection. These include application of unsupervised
learning to improve detection, learning similarity functions for
detecting URLs, and learning interpretable models by string
pattern mining for matching URLs. In the following we briefly
discuss these problem settings for application to Malicious
URL Detection.
1) Unsupervised Learning: Unsupervised learning is the
scenario where the true label of the data is not available
during the training phase. These approaches rely on anomaly
detection techniques where the anomaly is defined as an
abnormal behavior. There are several algorithms in literature
that can be used for anomaly detection (e.g. clustering, 1-
class SVMs, etc.). Unfortunately, due to the extremely diverse
set of URLs, it is hard to determine what is ”normal” be-
havior and what is an anomaly. As a result, such techniques
have not become very popular for malicious URL detection.
However, some techniques have tried to use unsupervised
techniques in conjunction with supervised techniques to im-
prove performance. For example, [94] integrate supervised
and unsupervised learning in two stages. In the first stage,
the supervised prediction model predicts malicious URLs. For
those that are classified as benign, a 1-class SVM is used to
look for anomalies. [137] follow another style of integration
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of supervised and unsupervised where first k-means clustering
is performed, and the cluster ID is used as a feature to train a
classifier. [138] proposed the usage of an unsupervised hash-
based clustering system, wherein specific clusters were labeled
as malicious or benign (based on majority of the training data).
2) Similarity Learning: Similarity learning aims to learn
how similar two instances are (or in our case, how similar
2 URLs are). This field helps us identify which specific
legitimate URLs are being mimicked by the attackers. For this
setting, there is a set of protected URLs, and a set of suspicious
URLs which are potentially trying to mimic the protected
URLs. The aim is to measure the similarity of the suspicions
URLs with the protected URLs, and if the similarity is above
a specific threshold, we are able to spot a malicious URL. This
setting has been largely addressed by extracting visual features
[57], [58], [58]–[60], and computing the similarity between the
images of the suspicious and the protected URLs.
Another closely related area is learning using kernel func-
tions (which are essentially notions of similarity, and also al-
low models to learn nonlinear classifiers [103]. The prediction
function takes the following form:
ft(xt) =
t−1∑
i=1
αiκ(xi,xt) (13)
where αi is the coefficient for each instance learnt by some
learning algorithm, and κ denotes a kernel function (e.g., a
polynomial or Gaussian kernel) which measures the similarity
between the two instances. Whenever αi 6= 0, the train-
ing instance is often known as a support vector. There has
been abundant literature on using kernels both in batch and
online settings. The batch setting requires a lot of memory
and computational resources, which is often intractable in
the real world. Online Learning with kernels [139] follows
similar approaches as most other online learning techniques
except that the pool of support vectors often will increasingly
expand whenever there is a mistake in the online learning
process. This will result in a very undesired drawback, i.e., the
unbounded support vector size, which not only increases the
computational cost but also the need for huge memory space
for storing all the support vectors in online learning systems.
To address this problem, budget online kernel learning has
been extensively studied in online learning. Examples include
Randomized Budget Perceptron [140], Forgetron [141], Pro-
jectron [142], and Bounded Online Gradient Descent [143].
Some of these techniques were empirically studied by [28]
for malicious URL detection, but they did not manage to get
satisfactory performance. This is not a surprising result, as
any small budget size that would enable scalable computation
would miss out on most of the instances to be stored as
URLs, and will give a very poor kernel approximation. With
the recent development of efficient functional approximation
techniques for large-scale online learning with kernels [144],
[145], it may be possible to obtain competitive performance.
Further, Online Multiple Kernel Learning [146], [147] ap-
proaches allow for learning with multi-modality, wherein
different feature sets correspond to different modalities.
3) String Pattern Matching: As discussed in the previous
sections, lexical features are often obtained in the form of bag-
of-words representation, which is often abnormally of high
dimensionality and could grow over time. Using such prede-
fined features may not be practical for real-world deployment,
and such an approach may cause hindrance to interpreting
particular common types of attacks. Further, such techniques
cannot identify signatures in the form of substrings. To address
these issues, [88] proposed a dynamic string pattern mining
approach which borrowed the ideas from efficient searching
and substring matching. A similar approach based on Trigrams
was also developed by [148]. [31]–[33] also designed an
approximate string matching strategy to improve over the exact
match required by blacklists. While these methods performed
string pattern analysis on the URL string, [54] performed
string pattern analysis on JavaScript features.
E. Summary of Machine Learning Algorithms
There are a a wide variety of machine learning algorithms
in literature that can be directly used in the context of
Malicious URL Detection. Due to potentially a tremendous
size of training data (millions of instances and features), there
was a need for scalable algorithms, and that is why Online
Learning methods have found a lot of success in this domain.
Efforts have also been made to exploit the sparsity of the data
to improve the algorithmic performance. Lastly, there have
been efforts in modifying the problem from a typical binary
classification algorithm to address class imbalance and multi-
class problems. Using these technologies to build live systems
is another challenging task. In the following we discuss real
systems to demonstrate how Malicious URL Detection can be
used as a service. We categorize the representative references
according to the machine learning methods applied in Table
III.
V. MALICIOUS URL DETECTION AS A SERVICE
Malicious URL detection using machine learning can have
immense real-world applications. However, it is nontrivial to
make it work in practice. Several researchers have proposed
architectures for building end-to-end malicious URL Detection
systems and deployed them for real-world utilities. Many have
focused on providing services to Online Social Networks like
Twitter, where users share plenty of URLs ( [10], [69], [72],
[73] etc.)
A. Design Principles
When designing and building a real-world malicious URL
detection system using machine learning techniques, we aim
to achieve the following desired characteristics and goals:
(i) High Accuracy: This is often one of the most important
goals to be achieved for any malicious URL detection. Ideally,
we want to maximize the detection of all the threats of
malicious URLs (“true positives”) while minimizing the wrong
detection of classifying benign URLs into malicious (“false
positives”). Since no system is able to guarantee a perfect de-
tection accuracy, a practical malicious URL detection system
often has to trade off between the ratios of false positives
and false negatives by setting different levels of detection
thresholds according to the application needs.
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TABLE III
REPRESENTATIVE REFERENCES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS USED FOR MALICIOUS URL DETECTION
Methodology Sub Category Representative References
Batch Learning
SVM [10], [12], [35], [40]–[43], [47], [48], [50], [69], [70], [79], [81], [92], [93]
Logistic Regression [8], [12], [19], [48], [50], [62], [70], [79]
Nave Bayes [19], [48], [50], [71], [97]
Decision Trees [10], [12], [19], [22], [41], [42], [44], [48], [70], [71], [80], [97]
Ensembles and others [20], [46], [83], [84], [87], [106]
Online Learning
First-order algorithms [13], [28], [37], [73], [109]–[111]
Second-order algorithms [28], [36], [39], [76], [85], [113], [114]
Cost-Sensitive Online Learning [115], [116]
Online Active learning [116], [121], [123]
Representation Learning Feature Selection [35], [92], [124]–[131]Sparsity Regularization [73], [132]–[136]
Other Learning
Similarity Learning [57], [58], [58]–[60]
Unsupervised Learning [94], [137], [138]
String Pattern Matching [31]–[33], [54], [88], [148], [149]
(ii) Fast Detection: The detection speed is another important
concern for a practical malicious URL detection system,
particularly for online systems or cybersecurity applications.
For example, when deploying the malicious URL detection
service in online social networks like Twitter, whenever a user
posts any new URL, an ideal system should be able to detect
the malicious URL immediately and then block the URL and
its related tweets in real time to prevent any threats and harms
to public. For some cybersecurity applications, the requirement
of detection speed could be more severe, which sometimes
needs the detection to be done in milliseconds such that a
malicious URL request can be blocked immediately in real
time whenever a user clicks on any URLs.
(iii) High Scalability: Consider the increasing huge amount
of URLs, a real-world malicious URL detection system must
be able to scale up for training the models with millions or
even billions of training data. In order to achieve the high
scalability desire, there are two major kinds of efforts and
solutions. The first is to explore more efficient and scalable
learning algorithms, e.g., online learning or efficient stochastic
optimization algorithms. The second is to build scalable learn-
ing systems in distributed computing environments, e.g., using
emerging distributed learning frameworks (such as Apache
Hadoop or Spark) on the clusters.
(iv) Strong Adaptation: A real-world malicious URL detec-
tion system has to deal with a variety of practical complexity,
including adversarial patterns such as concept drifting where
the distribution of malicious URLs may change over time
or even change in adversarial way to bypass the detection
system, missing values (e.g., features that are unavailable or
too expensive to compute in required time cost), increasing
number of new features, etc. A real-world malicious URL
detection system must have a strong adaptation ability to work
effectively and robustly under most circumstances.
(v) Good Flexibility: Given the high complexity of mali-
cious URL detection, a real-world malicious URL detection
system with machine learning should be designed with good
flexibility for easy improvements and extensions. These in-
clude the quick update of the predictive models with respect to
new training data, being easy to replace the training algorithm
and models whenever there is a need, being flexible to be
extended for training models to deal with a variety of new
attacks and threats, and finally being able to interact with
human beings whenever there is a need, e.g., active learning
or crowdsourcing for enhancing performance.
B. Design Frameworks
In the following, we discuss some real-world implemen-
tations, heuristics and systems that have attempted to make
Malicious URL Detection as a service in reality.
[73] designed a framework called Monarch, and the idea of
providing Malicious URL Detection as a service was floated.
Monarch would crawl web-services in real-time and determine
whether the URL would be malicious or benign. Differences
in malicious URL distribution between Twitter and Spam
Emails were observed, and accordingly different models were
built for both. Monarch, at the time of development, could
process 15-million URLs a day for less than $800 per day. The
implementation of this system comprises a URL aggregator
which collects URLs from some data streams (e.g., Twitter
or Emails). From these URLs, features are collected, which
are then processed and converted into sparse features in the
feature extractor. Finally, a classifier is trained on the pro-
cessed data to detect malicious URLs. The collected features
include both URL-based features and content-based features.
In addition, initial URLs, landing URLs, and Redirects are also
extracted. For fast classification training from the perspective
of efficiency in memory and algorithmic updates, a linear
classifier based on logistic regression with the L1-regularizer
(for inducing sparse models) is trained on a distributed com-
puting architecture [150], [151]. They are able to process an
entire URL in 5.5 seconds on average, most of which is spent
on extracting the features. The prediction is relatively very
efficient.
[77] applied machine learning techniques to predict ma-
licious URLs, and subsequently attempted to maintain a
blacklist of malicious URLs using these predictions. Prophiler
[19] is another system, where it recommends that the URL
classification to be performed in a two-stage process. The first
stage would be by analyzing the light-weight URL features,
and quickly filtering out URLs for which the classifier has a
high confidence. For the low confidence predictions, a more
intensive content based analysis can be performed. Warning-
Bird [69] is similar to Monarch in that the primary aim is to
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detect suspicious URLs in a Twitter streams except that it uses
heuristics to obtain new features, and the classifier used was
an SVM model using LIBLINEAR [152] and not trained on a
distributed architecture. BINSPECT [20] is another system that
was developed to take advantage of ensemble classification,
where the final prediction was made on the basis of confidence
weighted majority voting.
VI. PRACTICAL ISSUES AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Despite many exciting advances over last decade for mali-
cious URL detection using machine learning techniques, there
are still many open problems and challenges which are critical
and imperative, including but not limited to the following.
(i) High volume and high velocity: The real-world URL data
is obviously a form of big data with high volume and high
velocity. In August 2012 [153] disclosed that Google’s search
engine found more than 30 trillion unique URLs on the Web,
and crawls 20 billion sites a day. It is almost impossible to train
a malicious URL detection model on all the world’s URL data
using machine learning. A clever way of sampling effective
URL training data (including both malicious and benign ones)
and training them using efficient and scalable machine learning
algorithms will be always an open question for researchers in
both machine learning and cybersecurity communities.
(ii) Difficulty in acquiring labels: Most existing malicious
URL detection approaches by machine learning are based on
supervised learning techniques, which require labeled training
data including both benign and malicious URL data. The
labeled data can be obtained by either asking human experts to
label or acquiring from blacklists/whitelists (which were often
also labeled manually). Unfortunately the scale of such labeled
data is tiny as compared to the size of all available URLs
on the web. For example, one of the largest public available
malicious URL training data sets in academia [28] has only 2.4
million URLs. Thus, there is a large room for open research in
resolving the difficulty of acquiring labeled data or learning
with limited amount of labeled data. One possible direction
is to go beyond purely supervised learning by exploring
unsupervised learning or semi-supervised learning, such as
active learning in some recent studies [116]. Another possible
direction is to explore crowdsourcing techniques [154], [155]
by facilitating organizations and individuals to label and share
malicious URLs, which however is nothing trivial given the
practical concerns of cost, privacy and security threats of
sharing malicious URLs. More innovations could be explored
in the future.
(iii) Difficulty in collecting features: As mentioned in the
previous section, collecting features for representing a URL is
crucial for applying machine learning techniques. However,
it is often not a trivial task for collecting many kinds of
features for a URL. In particular, some features could be costly
(in terms of time) to collect, e.g., host-based features. Some
features might be missing, or noisy, or can not be obtained
due to a variety of reasons (e.g., IP/DNS addresses of a URL
may vary time to time). In addition, real-world URLs may
not always be alive. For example, as observed by [11], many
malicious URLs may be short lived, and thus accessing its
features (e.g., IP address) may not be possible when it is not
alive. Besides, some previous benign URLs may be stopped
for services, and then were replaced by some malicious URL
(or vice versa). All these challenges post a lot of research and
development difficulties for collecting features.
(iv) Feature Representation: In addition to high volume and
high velocity of URL data, another key challenge is the very
high-dimensional features (often in millions or even billion
scale). This poses a huge challenge in practice when training
a classification model with such very high-dimensional data.
Some commonly used learning techniques, such as feature
selection, dimension reduction and sparse learning, have been
explored, but they are far from solving the challenge effec-
tively. Besides the high dimensionality issue, another more
severe challenge is the evolving high dimensional feature
space, where the feature space often grows over time when
new URLs and new features are added into the training data.
This again poses a great challenge for a clever design of
new machine learning algorithms which can adapt to the
dynamically changing feature spaces. Recently [156] proposed
the usage of a character level Convolutional Neural Network
methodology to learn a URL embedding. Using similar deep
learning approaches to learn a URL embedding appears to be
a promising direction.
(v) Concept drifting and new emerging challenges: Another
challenge is the concept drifting where the distribution of
malicious URLs may change over time due to the evolving
behaviours of new threats and attacks. This requires machine
learning techniques to be able to deal with concept drifting
whenever it appears. Besides, another recent challenge is due
to the popularity of URL shortening services, which take a
long URL as input and produce a short URL as an output. Such
URL shortening services potentially offer an excellent way for
malicious hackers and criminals to hide their malicious URLs
and thus creates a new challenge for automated malicious URL
detection systems. Last but not least, it is almost for sure that
there will always new types of challenges for malicious URL
detection since sophisticated malicious hackers and criminals
will always find ways to bypass the cyber security systems.
How to make effective learning systems which can quickly
detect and adapt themselves for resolving new challenges will
be a long term research challenge. An additional issue is to
identify vulnerable websites which may become malicious in
the future [66]. This is important, as URLs deemed to be be-
nign in the past may get compromised and become malicious
in the future. This would also help the site administrators to
take steps to address such vulnerabilities.
VII. RELATED SURVEYS
Recent years have witnessed innovative applications of
machine learning in cyber security [157]–[159]. They discuss
a variety of other cyber threats, and do not focus on Malicious
URL Detection. For example, [159] present a survey on the
usage of machine learning and data mining techniques for
Cyber Security intrusion detection. While there are surveys
on Malicious URL Detection using Machine Learning, most
are either limited in scope or outdated. For example [160] did
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an empirical analysis of different machine learning techniques
for Malicious URL Detection in 2007, at a time when neither
features nor machine learning models for this task had been
extensively explored. [3], [15] gave a broad overview of
Phishing and its problems, but do not extensively survey the
feature representation or the learning algorithms aspect. [125]
focused on primarily feature selection for Malicious URL
Detection.
Malicious URL Detection is closely related to other areas of
research such as Spam Detection. [161] conducted a compre-
hensive survey in 2012, wherein they identified different types
of spam(Content Spam, Link Spam, Cloaking and Redirection,
and Click Spam), and the techniques used to counter them.
They categorized the Spam Detection techniques into Content-
based Spam Detection (using lexical features such as Bag of
Words and Natural Language Processing techniques), Link-
based spam detection (utilizing the information regarding
the connectivity of different URLs) and other miscellaneous
techniques. Spam Detection is heavily reliant on processing the
text in an email and utilizing natural language processing for
analysis. These techniques are not directly useful for Malicious
URL Detection, unless they are used to draw inference about
the context in which the URL has appeared. Despite some
overlap between the techniques used for spam detection and
malicious URL detection, spam detection techniques largely
qualify as techniques that use context-based features for de-
tecting malicious URLs. Other recent learning based spam
detection surveys include [162]–[164], many of which focus
on spam appearing in online reviews.
Another closely related area is Web Page Classification.
[165] conducted a survey on the features and algorithms
deployed for web-page classification. The most common types
of features used are the content features (text and HTML tags
on the page), and Features of Neighbors (classification based
on the the class label of similar web pages). After the feature
construction, standard classification techniques are applied,
often with focus on multi-class classification and hierarchical
classification. Like Spam detection, web-page classification
also benefits significantly from text classification techniques.
Spam Detection, Web Page Classification, and Malicious
URL Detection, all use a few similar types of features and
techniques to solve the problem. In practice, these methods and
feature can complement each other to improve the performance
of the machine learning models. In general, the features used
for Spam Detection and Web-page classification are a subset
of those features that are commonly used for Malicious URL
Detection.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Malicious URL detection plays a critical role for many
cybersecurity applications, and clearly machine learning ap-
proaches are a promising direction. In this article, we con-
ducted a comprehensive and systematic survey on Malicious
URL Detection using machine learning techniques. In par-
ticular, we offered a systematic formulation of Malicious
URL detection from a machine learning perspective, and then
detailed the discussions of existing studies for malicious URL
detection, particularly in the forms of developing new feature
representations, and designing new learning algorithms for
resolving the malicious URL detection tasks. In this survey,
we categorized most, if not all, the existing contributions for
malicious URL detection in literature, and also identified the
requirements and challenges for developing Malicious URL
Detection as a service for real-world cybersecurity applica-
tions.
Finally, we highlighted some practical issues for the appli-
cation domain and indicated some important open problems
for further research investigation. In particular, despite the
extensive studies and the tremendous progress achieved in the
past few years, automated detection of malicious URLs using
machine learning remains a very challenging open problem.
Future directions include more effective feature extraction and
representation learning (e.g., via deep learning approaches),
more effective machine learning algorithms for training the
predictive models particularly for dealing with concept drifts
(e.g., more effective online learning) and other emerging
challenges (e.g., domain adaption when applying a model to a
new domain), and finally a smart design of closed-loop system
of acquiring labeled data and user feedback (e.g., integrating
an online active learning approach in a real system).
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